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Abstract 
 
This research examines the relevance of inclusive development in modulating the role of 
governance on environmental degradation. The study focuses on forty-four countries in sub-
Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. The Generalised Method of Moments is employed 
as the empirical strategy and CO2 emissions per capita is used to measure environmental 
pollution. Bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are employed, notably: political 
governance (consisting of political stability/no violence and “voice and accountability”), 
economic governance (encompassing government effectiveness and regulation quality), 
institutional governance (entailing corruption-control and the rule of law), and general 
governance (a composite measure of political governance, economic governance and 
institutional governance). The following main findings are established. First, the underlying 
net effect in the moderating role of inclusive development in the governance-CO2 emissions 
nexus is not significant in regressions pertaining to political governance and economic 
governance. Second, there are positive net effects from the relevance of inclusive 
development in modulating the effects of regulation quality, economic governance and 
general governance on CO2 emissions. The significant and insignificant effects are elucidated. 
Policy implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The relevance of inclusive development in governance for environmental sustainability in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a worthwhile research endeavour for a multitude of reasons, 
inter alia: (i) inclusive development and sustainability are closely aligned with the post-2015 
sustainable development agenda; (ii) the importance of good governance in promoting 
environmental sustainability, and (iii) gaps in the literature. These three factors are expanded 
in the same order as they are highlighted.  
 First, in accordance with Amavilah, Asongu and Andrés (2017), inclusive 
development and environmental sustainability are closely linked in the prism that, for 
sustained development to reflect sustainability, it is worthwhile for it to be inclusive while for 
the inclusive development to mirror sustainability, it should withstand the test of being 
sustained over time. The underlying connections are relevant to the context of this research 
because we are focusing on inclusive development and environmental sustainability: the 
former by engaging the inequality-adjusted human development index as a policy variable 
and the latter because environmental degradation is understood as a policy syndrome that 
stifles environmental sustainability2. A mechanism by which the policy variable can be 
employed to tackle the policy syndrome is good governance.  
 Second, there is abundant literature that is consistent on the importance of good 
governance in the improvement of socio-economic and environmental outcomes in SSA. The 
attendant literature broadly supports the view that political will is essential in addressing the 
policy syndrome of environmental degradation, especially in the light of global targets and 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Some notable studies advancing this perspective 
include: Jones(2003), Odhiambo (2009a, 2009b, 2010), Afful-Koomson (2012), Apkan and 
Akpan (2012),  Hongwu (2013, Chemutai (2009), Odhiambo (2014a, 2014b),  Anyangwe 
(2014), Akinyemi, Alege, Osabuohien and  Ogundipe (2015), Carl (2016), Akinyemi, Efobi, 
Asongu  and Osabuohien (2018), Jarrett(2017), Asongu, le Roux and Biekpe (2018), Asongu 
(2018a) and Efobi, Tanankem, Orkoh, Atata, Akinyemi and Beecroft (2018).  
 Third, to the best of our knowledge, in the light of the issues and narratives covered in 
the preceding paragraphs, the extant literature has failed to assess linkages between inclusive 
                                                          
2
 The conception and definition of policy syndrome in the light of contemporary inclusive development literature 
is “inequality” or “growth that is not inclusive” (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Tchamyou, Erreygers & 
Cassimon, 2018). Asongu (2017) understands the concept of policy syndrome as a gap in knowledge economy 
between two countries. Within the framework of this study, policy syndrome represents environmental 
degradation and/or pollution.  
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development, governance and environmental degradation. The study closest to the present 
research is by Asongu and Odhiambo (2018a), which has investigated how environmental 
degradation affects inclusive human development in SSA. This research expands the 
underlying study on two main fronts. On the one hand, the focus is on environmental 
degradation instead of inclusive development. Hence, the outcome variable of the underlying 
study is employed as a policy variable in this research. On the other hand, governance 
channels are engaged as mechanisms by which inclusive development affects CO2 emissions. 
This is contrary to the underlying study which does not engage channels by which the 
independent variable of interest affects the outcome variable.  Therefore, the research 
question this study attempts to answer is the following: how does inclusive development 
modulate the effect of governance on CO2emissions in SSA? 
 The intuition motivating the investigation of nexuses between inclusive development, 
governance and environmental degradation is simple to follow. First and foremost, the fact 
that governance standards affect environmental quality is “a given”, as supported by attendant 
studies in the previous paragraph. Second, the equitable distribution of fruits from economic 
prosperity also affects the manner in which citizens contribute to CO2 emissions. 
Accordingly, when the fruits of economic prosperity are equitably distributed across the 
population, average wealth increases and the average citizen is more likely to contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions. Third, inclusive human development can plausibly affect how 
governance standards affect CO2 emissions. This is essentially because inclusive development 
and governance are also intricately connected (Andres, Asongu and Amavilah, 2015). For 
instance, economic governance within the framework of this study is understood as the 
formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. This definition 
aligns with the hypothetical nexus between inclusive development and environment 
degradation. On the empirical front, the empirical exercise is tailored such that inclusive 
human development complements governance to affect environmental degradation. To make 
this assessment, the net effects (from the unconditional impact of governance on CO2 
emissions and the conditional impact from the interaction between governance and inclusive 
development) are used to assess how inclusive development modulates the effect of 
governance on CO2 emissions. 
 In the light of the above, this research is also positioned as an empirical study that is 
focused on theory-building. Hence, it is in accordance with recent empirical literature 
supporting the framework that applied econometrics motivated by plausible intuition, is a 
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useful scientific activity. Moreover, in line with the attendant literature, applied econometrics 
should not exclusively be limited to the acceptance or rejection of existing theoretical 
underpinnings (Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
 The rest of the research proceeds as follows. Section 2 covers the data and the 
methodology. The empirical results are disclosed and discussed in section 3 while section 4 
concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data  
The focus of this research is on 44 SSA countries with data for the period 2000-20123. Of the 
49 countries in SSA, only 44 are involved in the study because of data availability constraints 
at the time of the study. The data is obtained from a multitude of sources, namely: (i) the 
inclusive human development index used as the moderating variable is obtained from the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP); (ii) six governance variables (political 
stability/no violence, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, 
corruption-control and the rule of law) are sourced from World Governance Indicators of the 
World Bank, and (iii) the three control variables (i.e. gross domestic product growth rate, 
population growth and education quality) and the proxy for environmental degradation (i.e. 
CO2 emissions per capita) are from World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
 The outcome variable of environmental pollution which is proxied by CO2 emissions 
per capita is consistent with recent environmental pollution literature in SSA (Asongu, 2018a, 
2018b). The governance mechanisms from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) are 
increasingly being used in the governance literature. Some recent studies that have employed 
these six governance indicators include: Andrés et al. (2015), Pelizzo, Araral, Pak and  Xun 
(2016),  Pelizzo and Nwokora  (2016, 2018), Nwokora and Pelizzo (2018), Oluwatobi, Efobi, 
Olurinola and Alege (2015), Ajide and Raheem (2016a, 2016b) and Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2017b). According to the attendant literature: “The first concept is about the process by 
which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice and 
accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of government to 
formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic Governance): regulatory 
                                                          
3The 44 countries are: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic. Republic., Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no means least, regards the respect for 
citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them (Institutional 
Governance): rule of law and control of corruption” (Andres et al., 2015, p. 1041). 
 The adopted inclusive development variable is the inequality-adjusted human 
development (IHDI), which is the human development index (HDI) that is adjusted for 
inequality. Accordingly, the “The human development index (HDI) denotes a national mean 
of results in three principal dimensions, notably: health and long life, knowledge and basic 
living standards. The IHDI goes a step further by adjusting the HDI to prevalent levels of 
inequality in the aforementioned three dimensions. In other words, the IHDI also takes into 
consideration the manner in which the three underlying achievements are distributed within 
the population”(Asongu et al., 2017, p. 355). 
 Three main control variables are adopted in order to account for variable omission 
bias, notably: gross domestic product (GDP) growth, population growth and education 
quality. The first-two variables are intuitively expected to increase CO2 emissions while the 
sign of the third variable cannot be established with certainty.  Accordingly, it is natural to 
infer that economic prosperity in terms of GDP growth is associated with more CO2 
emissions. This is essentially because GDP growth is associated with more production and 
consumption of goods and services which entail processes that emit greenhouse gases. In the 
same vein, a rising population should be associated with enhanced possibilities of consuming 
commodities and engaging in economic activities, which ultimately bear positively on their 
contributions to greenhouse gas emissions. 
 The adopted education variable in this study is the pupil-teacher ratio. Compared to 
other levels of education, it is preferred essentially because of: (i) data availability constraints 
in obtaining other indicators of higher learning and (ii) the documented evidence that 
compared to higher levels of education, primary education has comparatively higher 
development externalities in countries at initial stages of industrialization. Some studies 
supporting this thesis include:  Petrakis and Stamakis (2002) and Asiedu (2014). In the light 
of the measurement of this education indicator, an increasing ratio denotes decreasing 
education quality because more pupils are required to be accommodated by the same teacher, 
ceteris paribus. Hence, while we expect higher quality education to reduce CO2 emissions, 
the knowledge imparted on environmental degradation may not require the ability of a single 
teacher to focus exclusively on a select number of pupils. It follows that the sign of this 
variable cannot be established a priori.  
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The limitation to only three control variables is motivated by the failure of estimated 
models to pass post-estimation diagnostics tests when more instruments are involved in the 
regressions. Accordingly, even when instruments are collapsed in the estimation process, such 
proliferation of instruments is still apparent. The use of three control variables is not 
uncommon in the scholarly literature given that Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini (2012) have 
used two control variables, while Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017c) and Osabuohien and 
Efobi (2013) have used no control variable.The definitions and sources of the variables are 
provided in Appendix 1 while the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 
presents the correlation matrix. For lack of space, the appendices are available upon request. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
In order to increase the robustness of the findings, the research is consistent with recent 
literature in reducing the governance dimensions by means of PCA. Attendant African 
knowledge economy and governance studies on which this research builds include: Tchamyou 
(2017) and Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019). Accordingly, the purpose of the 
PCA is to reduce the six governance dynamics into four main dimensions: (i) political 
stability/no violence and “voice & accountability” are reduced to political governance; (ii) 
government effectiveness and regulation quality are reduced to economic governance; (iii) 
corruption-control and the rule of law are reduced to institutional governance and (iv) political 
stability/no violence, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, 
corruption-control and the rule of law are reduced to general governance.  
 The criteria used to select common factors are from the Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe 
(2002) rule of thumb which requires that eigenvalues that are higher than the mean should be 
retained. The corresponding retained eigenvalue should also reflect at least 70% of combined 
information in the constituent indicators. The findings of the PCA are presented in Table 1. 
From the table, it is apparent that the underlying criteria are respected in the retention of the 
common factors: political governance (Polgov), economic governance (Ecogov), institutional 
governance (Instgov) and General governance (G.Gov) respectively, reflect eigenvalues 
(variations) of 1.671, 1.878, 1.861 and 4.892 (83.5 %, 93.9 %, 93.0 % and 81.50%). 
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
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2.2.2 GMM Specification  
Borrowing from Tchamyou (2019a, 2019b), the mode of empirical analysis adopted in this 
research is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Drawing on the underlying 
literature, at least four factors motivate the choice of the empirical strategy. First, the outcome 
variable of CO2 emissions is persistent because the correlation between its level and first lags 
values is higher than the threshold of 0.800, which is the rule of thumb for establishing 
persistence in an indicator (Tchamyou et al., 2019). Second, the number of countries under 
investigation is higher than the number of periods in each country. Third, cross-country 
variations are considered in the empirical analysis because the data structure is panel. Fourth, 
the concern of endogeneity is tackled from two fronts: (i) reverse causality or simultaneity is 
addressed with the help of a process of instrumentation and (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity 
is also taken on board by means of controlling for time invariant omitted variables.  
The methodological framework adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
approach. This improvement of the GMM technique (from Arellano & Bover, 1995) has been 
established to restrict the proliferation of instruments in contemporary development literature, 
notably: Asongu and Nwachukwu, (2016b), Tchamyou et al. (2019) and Boateng, Asongu, 
Akamavi and Tchamyou (2018).  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where tiCO , is the CO2 emissions variable of  country i
 
in  period t , 0 is a constant, HD
represents inclusive human development, G  entails governance   (political stability, voice & 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and corruption-
control, political governance, economic governance, institutional governance and general 
governance), HDG  denotes an interaction between a CO2 emission variable and governance 
(“political stability” × “inclusive development”, “voice & accountability” × “inclusive 
development”, “government effectiveness” × “inclusive development”, “regulation quality” × 
“inclusive development”, “corruption-control” × “inclusive development”,  “rule of law” × 
“inclusive development”, “political governance” × “inclusive development”,   “economic 
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governance” × “inclusive development”,   “institutional governance” × “inclusive 
development”,  and  “general governance” × “inclusive development”), W  is the vector of 
control variables (GDP growth, population growth and education quality), represents the 
coefficient of auto-regression which is one within the framework of this study because a year 
lag is enough to capture past information, t is the time-specific constant, i is the country-
specific effect and ti , is the error term.  
 
2.2.3 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
  
 In the light of the specification process in the previous section, this research is still 
consistent with that attendant contemporary literature in the strategy of identification and 
exclusion restrictions, notably: Asongu and Nwachukwu, (2016c), Tchamyou and Asongu 
(2017), Boateng et al. (2018), Meniago and Asongu(2018) and Tchamyou et al. (2019). In 
essence, the strategy of identification is such that the years are considered to be strictly 
exogenous variables while the endogenous explaining indicators are considered as 
endogenous explaining variables. Roodman (2009b) accords with this strategy of 
identification because he has argued that invariant variables cannot be endogenous after a first 
difference4.  
 Contingent on the framework of identification, the assumption of exclusion restriction 
is validated when the alternative hypothesis of the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
instrument exogeneity is rejected. This alternative hypothesis is the position that the 
instruments are not valid. In others words, it is also the stance that the endogenous variables 
are main channels by which the strictly exogenous variables affect the outcome variable or 
CO2 emissions.  The underlying identification framework is broadly consistent with the 
standard instrumental variable (IV) strategy in which a rejection of the alternative hypothesis 
of the Sargan test is an indication that the instruments are valid (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Levine, 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d).  
 
3. Presentation of results 
 The empirical findings are disclosed in this section. Table 2 presents nexuses between 
political governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation while Table 3 
shows results of linkages between economic governance, inclusive development and 
environmental degradation. In Table 4, the findings on connections between institutional 
                                                          
4Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation are disclosed, whereas 
Table 5 focuses on linkages between general governance, inclusive development and 
environmental degradation. Four main information criteria are employed to assess the post-
estimation validity of the GMM findings5. Based on these criteria, the models are 
overwhelmingly valid with a few exceptions, notably:  the first estimations on government 
effectiveness in Table 3 and general governance in Table 5 where the null hypothesis of the 
Hansen test is rejected. It is relevant to note that the Hansen test is robust but sensitive to the 
proliferation of instruments whereas the Sargan test is not robust but not sensitive to the 
proliferation of instruments. Hence, a cautious approach is to adopt the Hansen test and avoid 
the proliferation of instruments by ensuring that in every specification, the number of cross 
sections is higher than the corresponding number of instruments.  
 In order to assess the overall effect of the role of inclusive development in modulating 
the impact of governance on CO2 emissions, net effects are computed. The computation of 
these net effects entails both the conditional and the conditional effects of governance 
dynamics: the latter effect being the impacts from the estimates corresponding to the 
interaction between inclusive development and governance dynamics. For instance, in the 
second column of Table 3, the net effect of inclusive development in modulating the 
relevance of regulation quality in CO2 emissions is 0.0459([0.551× 0.450] + [-0.202]). In the 
calculation, the average value of inclusive human development is 0.450, the unconditional 
impact of regulation quality is -0.202 and conditional effect from the interaction between 
regulation quality and inclusive development is 0.551. This approach to computing net effects 
is consistent with contemporary literature on interactive regressions (Tchamyou & Asongu, 
2017; Agoba et al., 2019).  
 The underlying net effects cannot be established from Table 2 and Table 4 because at 
least one estimated coefficient required for their computations is not significant. In Table 3 
and Table 5, there is a positive net effect from the relevance of inclusive development in 
modulating the effects of regulation quality, economic governance and general governance on 
CO2 emissions.   
                                                          
5
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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“Insert Tables 2-5 here”  
 
 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
4.1 Findings  
 
 This research has examined the relevance of inclusive development in modulating the 
role of governance on environmental degradation. The study focuses on 44 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. The Generalised Method of Moments is employed 
as empirical strategy and the CO2 emissions per capita is used to measure environmental 
pollution. Bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are employed notably: political 
governance (consisting of political stability/no violence and “voice & accountability”), 
economic governance (encompassing government effectiveness and regulation quality), 
institutional governance (entailing corruption-control and the rule of law) and general 
governance (a composite measure of political governance, economic governance and 
institutional governance). The following main findings are established. First, the underlying 
net effect in the moderating role of the inclusive development in the governance-CO2 
emissions nexus is not significant in regressions pertaining to political governance and 
economic governance. Second, there are positive net effects from the relevance of inclusive 
development in modulating the effects of regulation quality, economic governance and 
general governance on CO2 emissions.  
 While the results have produced effects we did not anticipate, two facts are worth 
articulating before further discussion the results. On the one hand, unexpected findings have 
as much economic significance and policy relevance as expected findings. On the other hand, 
the insignificant findings also have as much economic significance and policy relevance as 
significant findings. Concerning the latter insights, the insignificant findings should not be 
understood within the framework of publication bias or a “file drawer” concern in social 
science research, where insignificant, null and unexpected findings are discarded in 
preference for significant, strong and expected results (Rosenberg, 2015; Franco, Malhotra & 
Simonovits, 2014; Boateng et al., 2018). The underlying two points are expanded for policy 
implications. 
 
4.2 Conclusions  
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 First, the unexpected findings can be explained from two perspectives which also 
double as policy implications. (i) When the fruits of economic prosperity are equitably 
distributed across the population by means of better education, more income and enhanced 
health facilities (i.e. components of the human development index), the average person is 
endowed with more opportunities of participating in the production and consumption 
processes that are positively correlated with the emission of greenhouses gases. (ii) Good 
governance is a necessary but not a sufficient mechanism for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. This is partly because the governance standards in most countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa are poor and partly because it might be relevant to complement the attendant 
governance mechanisms with other factors that are exogenous to greenhouse gas emissions in 
order to have the expected net negative sign on CO2emissions. On the front of low 
governance standards in the sub-region, it is worthwhile to articulate that the governance 
variables have positive and negative values and hence, the negatively skewed distributions of 
the underlying variables (which is a feature of governance variables in Africa) can be 
construed as poor governance instead of good governance.  
 Second, the insignificant findings from institutional governance and political 
governance dynamics may be traceable to the fact that the conception and definition of 
inclusive human development is most aligned with economic governance. Accordingly, 
economic governance is conceived and defined in this study as the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. These public commodities are 
inherent components of the inclusive human development index.  
 Future studies can extend the established findings by considering alternative 
mechanisms by which environmental pollution can be mitigated in order to promote the green 
economy. Moreover, assessing if the findings withstand empirical scrutiny from country-
specific standpoints is also worthwhile. This latter recommendation for future research is 
motivated by the fact that country-specific effects are inherently eliminated in the GMM 
specification in order to control for endogeneity. While this study focuses exclusively on CO2 
emissions, there are other environmental problems that should also be the focus of future 
research, notably: land erosion, sea rise, biodiversity loss, rapid desertification, rainforest loss, 
and urban pollution.  
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.395 0.372 0.411 0.426 0.439 0.404 0.815 0.815 4.892 
Second  PC -0.037 0.873 -0.357 -0.303 0.037 -0.124 0.067 0.883 0.407 
Third PC 0.747 -0.035 0.157 -0.131 -0.086 -0.626 0.052 0.935 0.314 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Econgov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
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Table 2: Political governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Political Stability (PS) Voice & Accountability (VA) Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.875*** 0.949*** 0.887*** 0.951*** 0.872*** 0.944*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability (PS) 0.023 -0.016 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.716) (0.773)     
Voice & Accountability (VA) --- --- -0.102   -0.010 --- --- 
   (0.146) (0.906)   
Political Governance (Polgov) --- ---  --- 0.001 -0.045 
     (0.978) (0.249) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.175 0.187 0.418** 0.358 0.271 0.139 
 (0.567) (0.344) (0.047) (0.022) (0.244) (0.359) 
PS ×ID -0.011 0.113 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.944) (0.388)     
VA × ID --- --- 0.278* 0.127 --- --- 
   (0.050) (0.530)   
Polgov × ID --- --- --- --- 0.037 0.184** 
     (0.736) (0.048) 
GDP growth  --- 0.00004 --- 0.0001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.936)  (0.785)  (0.593) 
Population growth  --- 0.002 --- -0.002 --- 0.003 
  (0.880)  (0.869)  (0.784) 
Education  --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0005 
  (0.213)  (0.214)  (0.542) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects na na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.036) (0.012) (0.040) (0.018) (0.035) (0.016) 
AR(2) (0.120) (0.419) (0.111) (0.166) (0.126) (0.322) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.415) (0.315) (0.227) (0.468) (0.424) (0.366) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group --- (0.030) --- (0.042) --- (0.033) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.736) (0.692) (0.552) (0.815) (0.672) (0.742) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group --- (0.077) --- (0.077) --- (0.114) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.773) --- (0.948) --- (0.743) 
       
Fisher  447.73*** 833608*** 4661.87*** 81816.60*** 2036.66*** 99029.57*** 
Instruments  25 36 25 36 25 36 
Countries  42 41 42 41 42 41 
Observations  347 244 347 244 347 244 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the estimations. The mean value of inclusive human development 
is 0.450.  
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Table 3: Economic governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Regulation Quality 
 (RQ)  
Government Effectiveness 
(GE)  
Economic Governance 
(Ecogov) 
    
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.989*** 0.953*** 0.868*** 0.965*** 0.973*** 0.962*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation Quality  (RQ) -0.202** 0.030 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.010) (0.708)     
Government Effectiveness (GE) --- --- -0.217** 0.176 --- --- 
   (0.034) (0.224)   
Economic Governance (Ecogov) --- --- --- --- -0.075* 0.070 
     (0.099) (0.298) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.135 0.199 0.666** -0.164 -0.383** 0.236 
 (0.619) (0.359) (0.040) (0.478) (0.045) (0.190) 
RQ ×ID 0.551*** -0.030 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.824)     
GE × ID --- --- 0.556*** -0.290 --- --- 
   (0.005) (0.283)   
Ecogov × ID --- --- --- --- 0.223** -0.135 
     (0.012) (0.271) 
GDP growth  --- 0.00003 --- -0.0007 --- -0.00007 
  (0.946)  (0.166)  (0.899) 
Population growth  --- 0.008 --- 0.022** --- 0.019 
  (0.567)  (0.021)  (0.120) 
Education  --- -0.0009 --- -0.001** --- -0.001 
  (0.335)  (0.045)  (0.375) 
    
 
  
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Net effects 0.0459 na 0.0332 na 0.0253 na 
       
AR(1) (0.048) (0.017) (0.032) (0.017) (0.049) (0.017) 
AR(2) (0.115) (0.203) (0.124) (0.378) (0.123) (0.234) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.202) (0.608) (0.070) (0.166) (0.252) (0.340) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group --- (0.028) --- (0.027) --- (0.047) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.393) (0.954) (0.163) (0.455) (0.511) (0.648) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group --- (0.057) --- (0.023) --- (0.024) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (1.000) --- (0.789) --- (0.991) 
       
Fisher  11323.77*** 543058*** 2547.04*** 62431.83*** 6895.42*** 52370.01*** 
Instruments  25 36 25 36 25 36 
Countries  42 41 42 41 42 41 
Observations  347 244 347 244 347 244 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. The mean value of inclusive human development 
is 0.450.  
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Table 4: Institutional governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Rule of  Law  
(RL)  
Corruption Control  
 (CC)  
Institutional Governance 
(Instgov) 
    
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.836*** 0.953*** 0.879*** 0.959*** 0.853*** 0.963*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law (RL) -0.075 -0.029 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.445) (0.739)     
Corruption Control  (CC) --- --- -0.190 -0.092 --- --- 
   (0.240) (0.248)   
Institutional  Governance (Instgov) --- --- --- --- -0.071 -0.019 
     (0.305) (0.707) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.670* 0.173 0.547 0.300* 0.426 0.076 
 (0.083) (0.368) (0.364) (0.064) (0.296) (0.551) 
RL ×ID 0.158 0.183 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.491) (0.315)     
CC × ID --- --- 0.416 0.205 --- --- 
   (0.215) (0.179)   
Instgov × ID --- --- --- --- --- 0.057 
      (0.569) 
GDP growth  --- -0.00005 --- 0.0001 --- 0.0001 
  (0.930)  (0.774)  (0.794) 
Population growth  --- -0.002 --- 0.009 --- 0.003 
  (0.839)  (0.337)  (0.799) 
Education  --- -0.0007 --- -0.0006 --- -0.0006 
  (0.339)  (0.240)  (0.437) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects na na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.033) (0.017) (0.031) (0.017) (0.032) (0.018) 
AR(2) (0.103) (0.319) (0.109) (0.241) (0.113) (0.257) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.165) (0.427) (0.119) (0.592) (0.141) (0.653) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group --- (0.050) --- (0.071) --- (0.048) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.276) (0.745) (0.262) (0.854) (0.227) (0.936) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group --- (0.066) --- (0.152) --- (0.091) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.940) --- (0.929) --- (0.998) 
       
Fisher  3280.27*** 90777.73*** 1570.90*** 528408*** 3294.44*** 0.963*** 
Instruments  25 36 25 36 25 36 
Countries  42 41 42 41 42 41 
Observations  347 244 347 244 347 244 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. The mean value of inclusive human development 
is 0.450. 
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Table 5: General governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
     
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
   
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.886*** 0.901*** 0.917***   0.966*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
General Governance (Ggov) -0.062** -0.060*** 0.041* 0.015 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.059) (0.723) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.232 0.386*** 0.060 0.185 
 (0.280) (0.000) (0.734) (0.321) 
Ggov ×ID 0.156** 0.144*** -0.056 -0.025 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.131) (0.759) 
GDP growth  --- 0.0006* 0.0002 -0.00004 
  (0.076) (0.653) (0.923) 
Population growth  --- --- -0.020* 0.017 
   (0.084) (0.151) 
Education  --- --- --- -0.0005 
    (0.547) 
     
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Net effects 0.0011 0.0048 na na 
     
AR(1) (0.036) (0.041) (0.057) (0.017) 
AR(2) (0.118) (0.125) (0.112) (0.218) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.084) (0.102) (0.198) (0.380) 
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group --- (0.079) (0.005) (0.040) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.203) (0.170) (0.709) (0.728) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group --- --- (0.074) (0.060) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.200) (0.443) (0.916) 
     
Fisher  4224.87*** 9974.38*** 34319.29*** 45111.03*** 
Instruments  25 29 32 36 
Countries  42 42 42 41 
Observations  347 342 306 244 
     
“*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for 
the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. The mean value of inclusive human development 
is 0.450”.  
 
